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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintitf-Respondent. : Case. No. 860213-CA 
V8. I 
MANUAL LUCERO, x Priority 2 
Defendant-Appellant, t 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Should the defendant's appeal be summarily 
dismissed where he failed to cite to the record in support of his 
statement of facts and argument on appeal? 
2. Was the defendant properly denied his motion 
opposing state jurisdiction where he failed to comply with the 
federal removal statute and did not establish that he was 
entitled to removal under the applicable law? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The General Crimes Act, 18 D.S.C.A. S 1152, (West 1973) 
The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153, (West 1973) 
28 U.S.C.A. S 1446 (West 1973) 
Rules of Utah Court of Appeals Rule 24(a)(7) (1987) 
Rules ot Utah Supreme Court Rule 24(a)(7) (1987) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-502 (1978) 
fiejg. Addenda A through D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Manuel Lucero, was charged with making a 
false material statement a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8*502 (1978) (R. 2). 
Defendant was convicted of making a false material 
statement, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-8-502 (1978), on a guilty plea entered on March 12, 1986, in 
the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Duchesne County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge, presiding (R. 
53, 87). Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Richard C. 
Davidson, Judge, on May 19, 1986, to the indeterminate term of 
not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 61, 103). Execution of sentence was suspended and 
defendant was placed on probation for 18 months on the condition 
that he enter into an agreement with Adult Parole and Probation 
and abide by its terms; that he violate no State, federal, or 
municipal laws; tnat he pay a fine of $1,000; tnat he enter into 
and accept any therapy outline by Adult Parole and Probation; and 
that he serve twelve months in the Duchesne County Jail (jail 
sentence to be reviewed atter four months to determine 
eligibility for early release) (R. 61, 103-04). Execution of 
defendant's jail sentence was stayed pending this appeal (R. 
104). 
STATEMENT Qf THE fftCTS 
On September 10, 1984, the defendant testified in the 
case of Roosevelt City v. Patrick J, Hackford. Case No. 84-CR-124 
(R. 70). During that trial, defendant testified that he and a 
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Dale S em pie had taken Hackford to My ton, Utah, thus providing an 
alibi for Hackford at the time be and another man, Joe Lane, 
stole a car from Van Winterton just west of Roosevelt City on 
Highway 40 <R. 70-73, 79-80, 86-87). 
Defendant was subsequently charged with making a false 
material statement in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-502 
(1978) (R. 2, 87). At the preliminary hearing in the Seventh 
District Court, a transcript of defendant's previous testimony at 
Hackford's trial was presented as evidence (R. 68, 70-73), as 
well as the testimony of Joe Lane (R. 77-82). Lane testified 
that he and Hackford had stolen a Volkswagen and driven it to 
Myton the morning the defendant had previously testified be and 
Dale Semple had driven Hackford to Myton (R. 79-80). District 
Court Case Nos. 84-CR-055 and 056. 
Based on the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing, the Seventh District found probable cause to believe 
that the defendant had made a false material statement under oath 
at a criminal proceeding. Defendant was, therefore, bound over 
for trial (R. 1, 3-7, 91). 
Defendant was arraigned on March 4, 1985 (R. 17). Over 
twelve (12) months later, on March 12, 1986, defendant appeared, 
entered his guilty plea, and made an oral motion to the Seventh 
District Court contesting that court's jurisdiction, which the 
court requested be made in written form (R. 53). No written 
motion appears in the record; however, defendant filed a 
Memoranaum in Support of Removal to Federal Court in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court on April 4, 1986 (R. 54-57). In that 
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Memorandum, the defendant claimed the crime took place in "Indian 
country,• he was an Indian, tnat he was married to a member of 
the Ute tribe, that he lives in "Indian Country" within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C.A.S 1152, and tnat he holds himself out as a 
Ute and is treated as such by the Ute tribe (R. 54-57) . At no 
time did the defendant offer the trial court any evidence of his 
Indian status* 
Judgment was pronounced on May 19, 1986, at which time 
Judge Davidson denied defendant's motion regarding his objection 
to jurisdiction (R. 61)* 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's failure to cite to pages in the record to 
support his points on appeal requires this Court to assume 
regularity in the trial court's proceedings below and correctness 
in the judgment appealed from. 
Further, defendant is not entitled to removal ot his 
criminal prosecution for perjury for several reasons. First, he 
failed to properly petition to the federal district court for 
removal of his state criminal prosecution. Consequently, this 
issue is not properly before this Court. Second, even if his 
motion to the state court could be construed as a proper petition 
for removal to federal district court, this motion was not timely 
and in accordance with the federal removal statute. Therefore, 
state jurisdiction over his criminal proceeding was proper. And 
third, defendant carries the burden of showing he is entitled to 
removal to federal court. He has failed to offer any proot that 
he is an Indian within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A.S 1152 and is, 
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therefore, not entitled to federal jurisdiction over his case. 
Consequently, the state district court's exercise of jurisdiction 
over this case was proper, and the trial court was not in error. 
MgUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE HE FAILED TO CITE TO THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT HIS STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ARGUMENT 
IN HIS BRIEF, DEFENDANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE 
SUMMARILY DISMISSED. 
Rule 24(a)(7), R. Utah Court of Appeals (1987), 
requires that the defendant's brief contain a concise statement 
of the material facts ot the case, citing to pages of the record 
which support such statement.1 State v. Millioan. 727 P.2d 213, 
214-215 (Utah 1986)• Defendant has failed to comply with this 
rule. He cites to no pages of the record in support of his 
statement of facts. In State v. Sutton. 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
This failure to satisfy Rule 75(p)(2)(d) of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [now R. Utah 
Sup. Ct. Rule 24(a)(7)] (1987) and R. Utah 
Ct. App. Rule 24(a)(7)(1987)1 is itself 
grounds for our affirmance of the trial 
court's ruling. 
£££. £1£4 State v. Olmos. 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986) ; State V. 
TjicJifiir 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982) j and State v. Stegaell. 
660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983). In accordance with the holding ot 
SjuLL&oji, this Court should assume the correctness of Judge 
Davidson's denial of defendant's motion contesting jurisdiction 
* Rule 24(a)(7), R. Utah Court ot Appeals (1987), is virtually 
identical to Rule 24(a)(7) of R. Utah Supreme Court (1987). See 
Addendum A. 
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and the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction in general, and 
dismiss this appeal* 
POIHT XI 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO REMOVAL OF HIS 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR MAKING A FALSE 
MATERIAL STATEMENT (UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-8-502 
(1978)) TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT. 
A. Defendant Failed To Properly Petition To 
Federal District Court For Removal; 
Therefore, State Jurisdiction Over His 
Criminal Prosecution For Perjury Was Proper* 
Defendant claims the State of Utah lacks jurisdiction 
over his perjury prosecution because he is an American Indian 
living on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (Ute Reservation), the 
crime took place in Roosevelt City, which defendant claims is 
within the exterior boundaries of the Ute reservation, and the 
federal district court has jurisdiction over criminal activities 
of Indians committed in Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A.S 
1152 to the preclusion of state jurisdiction. He further claims 
that, therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
removal to federal district court. 
Section 1446, 28 U.S.C.A.(West 1973 « Supp. 1987), 
provides: 
(a) A defendant . • . desiring to remove 
any • . • criminal prosecution from a State court 
shall file in the district court ot the United 
States . . . a verified petition containing a 
short and plain statement of the facts which 
entitled him • • • to removal together with a copy 
of all process, pleadings and orders served upon 
him • • • in such action. 
(b) • • • • 
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(c)(1) A petition for removal of a criminal 
prosecution shall be filed no later than thirty 
days alter the arraignment in the State cowrtf or 
at any time before triali whichever is earlier* 
except that for good cause shown the United States 
district court may enter an order granting the 
petitioner leave to file the petition at a later 
time. 
(2) . • . • 
(3) The filing ot a petition for removal of 
a criminal prosecution snail not prevent the State 
court in which such prosecution is pending from 
proceeding further, except tftat a judgment of 
conviction shall not be entered unless tfce 
petition is first denied. 
(Emphasis added.) £&£. also Wright, Miller 6 Cooper, 14A Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Jurisdiction § 3721 et seq. (1*85). 
Moreover, "[blecause the removal statutes constitute a 
congressionally authorized encroachment by the federal court upon 
the sovereignty ot the state courts, they should be strictly 
construed and their procedures rigidly adhered to." People of 
the State of Mew York v. Mitchell, 637 F. Supp. noo, 1102 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), citing People of the State of New York v. Bell, 
617 F. Supp. 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1*85) ; People ot the State of New York 
v. Muka. 440 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). See also State of 
Georgia v> Waller, 660 F. supp. 952, 953-54 (M.D. Ga. 1987) 
(District Court held tfiat compliance with the procedural 
requirements ot 28 D.S.C.A.S 1446 (West 1973 & Supp. 1987) was 
required for actual removal of a state criminal prosecution); 
Smith v. State ot Indiana. 622 F. Supp. 973, 974-75 (D.C. Ind. 
1985) (provision requiring petition to be filed before trial held 
imperative and mandatory, to be strictly complied with and 
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narrowly construed)i and State of New Jersey v . Chesimard. 555 
F.2d 6 3 , 65 (3d Cir . 1977) . 
Defendant did not f i l e any p e t i t i o n for removal in the 
federal d i s t r i c t court for Utah. Ins tead , he made an oral motion 
t o the s t a t e t r i a l court in opposi t ion to s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n , and 
followed t h i s up only with a wri t ten memorandum in support of 
such motion (R. 53 , 54-57) • Because defendant made h i s motion to 
the wrong cour t , the State t r i a l court could not have passed on 
the motion, even i f i t bad been inc l ined to grant i t . He, 
there fore , has f a i l e d to s t r i c t l y comply with the mandatory and 
s t r i c t procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C.A.S 1446 (West 1973 & 
Supp. 1987) , and h i s appeal should be dismissed as not properly 
before t h i s Court. Wright v . London Grove Township. 567 F. Supp. 
768, 770 (E.D. Perm. 1985) (defendants seeking removal bear 
burden of e s tab l i sh ing that the requirements for removal are 
met ) . 
Moreover, s ince " l t l h e removal s t a t u t e i s not intended 
as a means of aborting or interrupting a s t a t e t r i a l ! , 1 " 
M i t c h e l l . 637 F. Supp. at 1103, the t r i a l c o u r t ' s e x e r c i s e of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n was proper, and i t was not error for Judge Davidson 
to deny defendant's motion in opposi t ion to j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
B. Even Assuming The Motion To The State 
Trial Court Objecting To Sta te J u r i s d i c t i o n 
Could Be Construed A Proper P e t i t i o n For 
Removal, I t Would Have Been Dismissed As 
Untimely. 
As noted prev ious ly , 28 U.S.C.A.S 1446(c)(1) (West 
Supp. 1987) requires a p e t i t i o n for removal to be f i l e d with the 
federal d i s t r i c t court within t h i r t y days a f ter arraignment in 
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the s t a t e court or any time before t r i a l (before the jury i s 
impaneled) , whichever i s e a r l i e s t . See .aLfifi. Waller, 660 F. Supp. 
at 953-54, and Smith. 622 F. Supp. at 974-75. Further, a 
defendant may l o s e or waive h i s r ight to remove by taking some 
substant ia l defens ive act ion in the s t a t e court before 
p e t i t i o n i n g for removal f such as f i l i n g a counterclaim or 
engaging in d i scovery . Wright, M i l l e r , & Cooper, 14A Federal 
Pract ice and Procedure, J u r i s d i c t i o n § 3732 (1985) . 
In the present c a s e , the defendant was arraigned on the 
perjury charge on March 4 , 1985 (R. 1 7 ) . He made h i s oral motion 
object ing t o s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n over a year l a t e r , on March 12 , 
1986 (R. 5 3 ) . Nothing writ ten was f i l e d contest ing s t a t e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n u n t i l April 4 , 1986, some th ir teen months af ter 
arraignment. C lear ly , defendant's motion, assuming i n arguendo 
i t was a proper p e t i t i o n for removal, was not t imely . Defendant 
has a l so f a i l e d to show any good cause for allowing a l a t e 
p e t i t i o n as required by 28 U.S.C.A.S 1446(c)(1) (West Supp. 
1987) . Addi t iona l ly , defendant pleaded gu i l ty in s t a t e court 
before making h i s motion opposing j u r i s d i c t i o n , thus waiving any 
r ight to remove to federal court . During the pronouncement of 
the judgment, defense counsel noted that he had reserved the 
r ight to chal lenge j u r i s d i c t i o n of the t r i a l court a t the time 
defendant pleaded g u i l t y . However, no such reservat ion appears 
in the record, and defendant has not c i t e d to the record to 
support t h i s c la im. £££ d i s c u s s i o n , Point I at 4 , and 
a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . 
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C. Defendant Has Made No Showing Of His 
Indian Status For The Purpose Of 18 U.S.C.A.S 
1152; Therefore, He Has Fai led To Meet His 
Burden Of Showing He I s Ent i t l ed To Removal 
To Federal Court* 
Defendant a s s e r t s that h i s r i g h t to removal i s based on 
18 U.S.C.A.S 1152, the General Crimes Act , which provides: 
Except as otherwise express ly provided by law, 
the general laws of the United S ta te s as to 
the punishment of o f fenses committed in any place 
within the s o l e and exc lus ive j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
United S t a t e s , except the D i s t r i c t of Columbia, 
s h a l l extend to the Indian Country* 
This s e c t i o n s h a l l not extend to o f fenses 
committed by one Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian, nor to any Indian 
committing any offense in the Indian country who 
has been punished by the l oca l law of the t r i b e , 
or to any case where, by treaty s t i p u l a t i o n s , the 
e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n over such of fenses i s or 
may be secured to the Indian t r i b e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . 2 
2The Major Crimes Act , 18 U.S.CA^S 1153, provides: 
Any Indian who commits against the person or 
property of another Indian or other person any of 
the fol lowing o f f e n s e s , namely, murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, carnal knowledge 
of any female, not h i s w i f e , who has not at ta ined 
the age of s i x t e e n y e a r s , a s s a u l t with in tent to 
commit rape, i n c e s t , a s s a u l t with in tent to commit 
murder, a s s a u l t with a dangerous weapon, a s s a u l t 
r e s u l t i n g in ser ious bodily injury , arson, 
burglary, robbery, and larceny within Indian 
country, s h a l l be subject to the same laws and 
p e n a l t i e s as a l l other persons committing any of 
the above o f f e n s e s , within the e x c l u s i v e j u r i s -
d i c t i o n of the United S t a t e s . 
This s t a t u t e does not included the crime of perjuryi there fore , 
defendant 's prosecut ion i s not within the exc lus ive j u r i s d i c t i o n 
of the federal c o u r t s . His only hope for federal j u r i s d i c t i o n i s 
28 U.S.C. S 1152, the General Crimes Act , and, as demonstrated in 
Point I I C, at 10 , that provis ion does not apply* 
Consequently, defendant's criminal prosecut ion was properly 
wi thin the s t a t e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
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In order to prosecute an individual under the General 
Crimes Act , the federal government i s required to prove, as a 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e q u i s i t e , that the crime occurred between an 
Indian and a non-Indian within Indian country, and that the crime 
was in v i o l a t i o n of a federal enclave law. 28 U.S.C.A.S 1152 and 
United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 454 (7tb cir. 1984), 
c i t i n g United Sta tes v . Wheeler. 435 U.S. 313, 324-25 (1978); 
United Sta tes v . Blue . 722 F.2d 383, 384-85 (8th Cir . 1983) | 
United S ta te s v . John. 587 F.2d 683, 686-87 (5th Cir . ) (on remand 
from the United S ta te s Supreme Court) , c e r t , denied. 441 U.S. 925 
(1979); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 287-300 (1982). 
Further, the United States Supreme Court has held t h a t , 
for purposes of 18 U.S.C.A.S 1152, crimes committed by non-
Indians against non-Indians, in Indian country, are subject to 
s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . United Sta tes v . McBratnev. 104 U.S. 621 
(1881)» New York ex rel« Ray v« Mar t i n , 326 u . s . 496 (1946). 
In Torres . 733 F.2d at 456, the Seventh Circui t Court 
of Appeals noted t h a t , upon a review of re levant case law, 
"It lhe t e s t [for Indian s t a t u s ] , f i r s t suggested 
in United Sta tes v. Rogers. 45 U.S. 567, 4 How. 
567, 11 L. Ed. 1105 (1845) , and general ly followed 
by the court6 , considers (1) the degree of Indian 
blood; and (2) t r i b a l or governmental recogni t ion 
as an Indian." (Emphasis added) United States v . 
Prone he av, 597 F.2d a t 1263. £££. a l££ United 
States v . Dodae. 538 F.2d at 786; F. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 23-27 (1982) . 
As the moving party chal lenging the lower c o u r t ' s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , Lucero c a r r i e s the i n i t i a l burden of producing 
s u f f i c i e n t evidence, beyond mere suppos i t ions or a l l e g a t i o n s to 
e s t a b l i s h a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l quest ion . Yeaze l l v . Copins. 98 Ariz . 
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109, 402 P.2d 541, 546 (1965), and United States Vt Hester. 719 
F.2d 1041 (9th Cir . 1983) . Since the bas i s of h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
chal lenge i s that be i s an Indian, he c a r r i e s the i n i t i a l burden 
of producing ££il&& £&£!£. evidence to e s t a b l i s h such. Hester . 
£JU2IL&, Moreover, Lucero, the defendant seeking removal to 
federal d i s t r i c t court from a s t a t e criminal prosecut ion, bore 
the burden of e s tab l i sh ing that the requirements for such removal 
were met. Wright Yt Lonflon Grove Township* 567 F . supp. at 770, 
cit ing Wilson v. Republic iron anfl Steel CQt# 257 u . s . 92 (1921). 
While defendant here has a l leged that he i s an Indian, 
i s married t o a Ute Indian, l i v e s in Indian country by v ir tue of 
h i s res idence in Roosevelt C i t y , Utah, holds himself out to be a 
Ute Indian, and i s treated by the tr ibe as such, he offered no 
proof to the t r i a l court to subs tant ia te these c la ims . Such mere 
a l l e g a t i o n s are i n s u f f i c i e n t to show that he i s an Indian 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.S 1152 and thus e n t i t l e d to removal and 
federal j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Because the defendant f a i l e d t o prove he i s an Indian 
within the meaning of § 1152, he f a i l s to meet the f i r s t 
requirement for federal j u r i s d i c t i o n ; consequently , there i s no 
need to d i s c u s s whether the crime occurred in Indian country or 
12-
was a v i o l a t i o n of federal enclave law. 4 
CONCLUSION 
In summaryf the defendant's appeal should be summarily 
dismissed because he f a i l e d to subs tant ia te h i s c laim of error by 
c i t i n g to the record on appeal. Moreover, the defendant f a i l e d 
t o properly p e t i t i o n for removal to federal d i s t r i c t court , did 
not present any object ion to s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n in a timely 
manner, and did not meet h i s burden of e s tab l i sh ing he was 
e n t i t l e d to removal. Therefore, the dec i s ion and sentence of the 
Seventh Jud ic ia l D i s t r i c t Court should be affirmed. 
4 Perjury i s a v i o l a t i o n of federal enclave law through the 
Assimilated Crimes Act , 18 U.S.C. § 1 3 , which provides: 
Whoever within or upon any of the p laces now 
e x i s t i n g or hereafter reserved or acquired as 
provided in s e c t i o n 7 of t h i s t i t l e [18 U.S.C. 
S 7 ] , i s g u i l t y of any act or omission which, 
although not made punishable by any enactment 
of Congress, would be punishable i f committed 
or omitted within the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the S t a t e , 
Terr i tory , Posses s ion , or D i s t r i c t in which such 
place i s s i t u a t e d , by the laws thereof in force 
at the time of such act or omission, s h a l l be 
g u i l t y of a l i k e offense and subject to a l i k e 
punishment. 
However, the s t a t u s of Roosevelt City and the surrounding area as 
within Indian Country i s discussed f u l l y in Respondent's Brief to 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clinton Perank. Case No. 
860243, at 17-48, March 4 , 1987, wherein i t i s demonstrated that 
Lucero's a c t s were not committed within Indian Country. Perank 
i s t e n t a t i v e l y scheduled for oral argument in the Supreme Court 
in October, 1987, pending a f i l i n g of an amicus brief by the Ute 
Tribe. For t h i s addit ional reason, s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n was 
proper. 
- 1 3 -
DATED this 'fl 'day of ^C^^/" 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
Rules of the Utah Suoreiae 
Court, Rule 24(a)(7) and 
24(e) (19C7) 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order here indicated: 
(7) a statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see Para-
graph (e)). 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected. 
Rules of the Utah Court of 
A~>oeals, Rule 24(a)(3) and 
(7)f and Rule 24(e) (1907) 
(a) Brief of appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under ap-
propriate headings and in the order here indicated: 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and other authori-
ties cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate brieily 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see Para-
graph (3)). 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected. 
ADDENDUM B 
18 U.S.C.A. S 1152 (West 1973), 
The General Crimes Act 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the genera] laws of the 
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place 
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the 
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against 
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any 
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the 
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction 
over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively. 
(June 25, 1948, c. *45. 62 Stat 757.) 
18 U.S.C.A. S 1153 (West Supp. 1987), 
The Major Crimes Act 
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or 
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnap-
ing, maiming, rape, involuntary sodomy, felonious sexual molestation of a minor, 
carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not attained the age of 
sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to 
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within 
the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other 
persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the United States. 
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and 
punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in 
which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense. 
(At amended Oct I t 1SS4, P*bi. 06-47S, TKk U, | 1009, 96 feat XU1; Miy IS, 1986, PubX. 
90-S03, 100 S u t 43* Not 10, 1S66, PubX. 1*446, f 17(0X5), 100 8t»t SS28, Nov. 10,1986, 
PmbX 99-664, | SUX5), 100 But SS6S.) 
ADDENDUM C 
28 U.S.C.A. S 1446 (West 1973 and Supp. 1987), 
Procedures for removal: 
(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action 
or criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district 
court of the United States for the district and division within which 
such action is pending a verified petition containing a short and 
plain statement of the facts which entitle him or them to removal 
together with a copy of all process, pleadings and orders served 
upon him or them in such action. 
(b) The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding shall 
be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, 
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting 
forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding IB 
based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the 
defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and 
is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is 
shorter. 
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a peti-
tion -for removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by 
the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended 
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. 
(c)(1) A petition for removal of a criminal prosecution shall be fifed not later than 
thirty days after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time before trial, 
whichever is earlier, except that for good cause shown the United States district 
court may enter an order granting the petitioner leave to file the petition at a later 
(*) A petition for removal of a criminal prosecution shall include all grounds for 
such removal. A failure to state grounds which exist at the time of the filing of the 
petition shall constitute a waiver of such grounds, and a second petition may be filed 
only on grounds not existing at the time of the original petition. For good cause 
shown, the United States district court may grant relief from the limitations of this 
paragraph. 
(I) The filing of a petition for removal of a criminal prosecution shall not prevent 
the State court in which such prosecution is pending from proceeding further, except 
that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered unless the petition is first denied. 
(4) The United States district court to which such petition is directed shall 
examine the petition promptly. If it clearly appears on the face of the petition and 
any exhibits annexed thereto that the petition for removal should not be granted, the 
court shall make an order for its summary dismissal. 
(5) If the United States district court does not order the nummary dismissal of 
such petition, H shall order an evidentiary hearing to be held promptly and after such 
hearing shall make such disposition of the petition as justice shall require. If the 
United States district court determines that such petition shall be granted, k shall so 
notify the State court m which prosecution is pending, which shall proceed no 
further. 
(d) Each petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding, except a petition in 
behalf of the United States, shall be accompanied by a bond with good and sufficient 
surety conditioned that the defendant or defendants will pay all costs and disburse-
ments incurred by reason of the removal proceedings should it be determined that 
the case was not removable or was improperly removed. 
(e) Promptly after the filing of such petition for the removal of a ejvfl action and 
bond the defendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse 
parties and shall file a copy of the petition with the clerk of such State court, which 
shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and mtfl 
the case is remanded. 
(f) If the defendant or defendants are in actual custody on process issued by the 
State court, the district court shall issue its writ of habeas corpus, and the marshal 
shall thereupon take such defendant or defendants into his custody and deliver a 
eopy of the writ to the clerk of such State court 
(As • • • • i l l Jifr Ss, WVfrskL SS-tS, j S, f l i s * W 
ADDENDUM D 
U t a h Code Ann. S 7 6 - 8 - 5 0 2 ( 1 9 7 8 ) : 
76-8-601 False or inconsistent material statements.—A person is guilty 
of a felony of the second degree if in any official proceeding: 
(1) He makes a false material statement under oath or affirmation 
or swears or affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and 
he does not believe the statement to be true; or 
(2) He makes inconsistent material statements under oath or affirma-
tion, both within the period of limitations, one of which is false and not be-
lieved by him to be true. In a prosecution under this section, it need not be 
alleged or proved which of the statements is false but only that one or the 
other was false and not believed by the defendant to be true. 
